Coherence on Trial: The Coronavirus Outbreak as a Critical Test for the European Union by Ilik, Goran & Shapkoski, Vesna
www.ssoar.info
Coherence on Trial: The Coronavirus Outbreak as a
Critical Test for the European Union
Ilik, Goran; Shapkoski, Vesna
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Ilik, G., & Shapkoski, V. (2020). Coherence on Trial: The Coronavirus Outbreak as a Critical Test for the European
Union. Studia Europejskie - Studies in European Affairs, 24(4), 25-43. https://doi.org/10.33067/SE.4.2020.2
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY-NC-ND Lizenz
(Namensnennung-Nicht-kommerziell-Keine Bearbeitung) zur




This document is made available under a CC BY-NC-ND Licence
(Attribution-Non Comercial-NoDerivatives). For more Information
see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0






Coherence on Trial: The Coronavirus Outbreak 
as a Critical Test for the European Union
Abstract 
Starting in Wuhan in December 2019, and making its way all the way 
to Rome and New York in April 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic has put 
the states, alliances and others, square in the face of a serious challenge. 
However, the question that happens to be a stumbling block this time has 
never been posed as a problem or obstacle before – the question of public 
health; a question that has taught the European Union a lesson about what 
is a top priority and how all the other policies, plans and strategies may 
seem unimportant overnight. This paper provides an analysis on how the 
European Union coped with the global threat given its limited legal pos-
sibilities, and the unprecedented situation of its Member States becom-
ing the second outbreak point of the pandemic. Moreover, the COVID-19 
pandemic, once again, has opened up the question of solidarity and the 
coherence within the EU. The conclusions drawn from this research are 
of great importance as a way to show whether the EU will come out of this 
situation with a positive outcome, confi rming its values of solidarity and 
coherence, or whether it will have to undertake drastic reforms in order to 
consolidate the latter.
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Introduction 
Every strategy and policy, both at national and international levels, 
has been tested and analysed to function under more or less regular cir-
cumstances. All of these strategies and policies fall into disrepair when 
there are unforeseen and unprecedented situations that bring about shifts 
at all levels of national and international relations. Moreover, the shifts 
are greater if the reason for them is one that has never or rarely been 
presented as a problem of international importance before. On January 
23rd, 2020, the city of Wuhan and its 9-million inhabitants in central 
China goes under lockdown in an attempt to prevent a new and deadly 
Coronavirus from spreading across the country and beyond.1 On the fi rst 
day of the lockdown, the number of people infected in Wuhan was 495.2 On 
January 30th, 2020, the Director-General of the World Health Organization 
Dr. Tedros A. Ghebreyesus declared a global state of emergency of inter-
national concern,3 the same day that the fi rst human transmission of the 
virus was registered in Chicago, USA.4 In the following two weeks, six 
European countries register cases. On March 12th, 2020, the pandemic 
of COVID-19, a Coronavirus-induced disease, is declared after the number 
of cases in the European region reaches a staggering 20,000 and the death 
toll rises to more than 1,000.5 From then on, this number has not stopped 
growing.
The governments have closed schools, institutions and borders, re-
stricted movement, introduced quarantine and social distancing, abolished 
public transport and banned mass gatherings, introduced alternative ways 
of communicating and working remotely – all in order to prevent the mass 
spread of the virus or at least to prevent exponential growth in the number 
of patients, in order to enable health systems to respond appropriately.
1  CGTN, ed., The lockdown: One month in Wuhan (motion picture), https://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=XU9FVqwO4TM&t=199s (access 10.08.2020).
2  Ibidem.
3  World Health Organization, COVID 19 Public Health Emergency of International 
Concern (PHEIC) (Publication), https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/covid-19-
public-health-emergency-of-international-concern-(pheic)-global-research-and-in-
novation-forum (access 24.07.2020).
4  L. Schencker, J. Villagomez, First US person-to-person case of Coronavirus reported 
in Chicago. ‘We believe people in Illinois are at low risk’, Chicago Tribune, https://www.
chicagotribune.com/business/ct-biz-illinois-spread-person-to-person-Coronavirus-
20200130-yqbxfhqotvagdmvc5ibgvvwugy-story.html (access 24.07.2020).
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The Coronavirus pandemic has turned almost every facet of social life 
in its head, and we will not be far from the truth if we say that in some 
way it was the end of the world as we knew it. Among other things, it was 
a blow to the effi ciency and capability of global institutions; they seem to 
have betrayed humanity when people needed joint action the most. In-
evitably, one of the loudest accusations were aimed against the European 
Union, pointing out that it betrayed its Member States as well as other 
smaller and weaker states that relied on its support but were left alone in 
the most diffi cult moments.
Therefore, in this paper we will try to conclude how the pandemic has 
affected the European Union, whether and why it missed the opportuni-
ties to act at certain points of time and what could have been done dif-
ferently, especially in the context of Italy and Spain as the EU’s outbreak 
point. From this experience, we will give certain conclusions regarding 
the specifi c nature of the EU as a supranational and intergovernmental 
regime that acts as a collective body but depends on its individual entities 
– the EU Member States. 
Solidarity and Coherence under Attack
The EU could be defi ned as a multi-level and complex post-national 
structure with post-modern nature that has developed its own way of inter-
pretation and arrangement of internal and external affairs. The EU is not 
a nation-state, and therefore cannot be treated as a modern structure. The 
EU is postmodern actor which operates in a postmodern world, beyond the 
nation-state limits, as a postnational structure. Postnationalism should be 
treated as a process that complements and supplements the nation-states’ 
performances, based upon the principles of mutual understanding, mutual 
openness and networking, oriented towards achieving the transcendental 
objectives, and thus, transcending the nation-states limits. 
Solidarity is a value ever-present in the basis of the EU and most of its 
Member States. The EU treaties explicitly refer to solidarity in a number of 
provisions, including the values and objectives of the Union and particular 
policies where the “principle” or the “spirit” of solidarity is to be applied.6 
Another value that is often discussed as a core to the EU’s complexity is 
coherence, or the value of bringing together all of its parts (Member States 
and institutions) into a harmonized mechanism of action from both inter-
nal and external aspects. The coherence comes from “the necessity for har-
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monization of parallel functioning political areas and managing of implica-
tions of structural complexity”.7 s far as the term ‘coherence’ goes, there are 
many defi nitions. The Merriam-Webster Dictionary defi nes coherence as: 
“systematic or logical connection or consistency” or “integration of diverse 
elements, relationships, or values”,8 while the Oxford’s Lexico defi nes it 
as: “the quality of being logical and consistent”9 or “the quality of forming 
a unifi ed whole”.10 The Cambridge Dictionary defi nes coherence as “the 
situation when the parts of something fi t together in a natural or reasonable 
way”11 or “a clear relationship between parts”.12 
It can be summarized that coherence means the ability of the parts or 
units from one whole or an entity to make common ground for action, 
based on shared values, common interests or common goals. 
The author Christopher Hill defi nes coherence as: “the ability to pull 
together diverse strands of policy and those responsible for managing 
them, into a single effi cient whole, capable of action, and resistant to third 
parties’ attempts to exploit internal division”.13 The theorists Joseph Ju-
pille and James A. Caporaso claim that coherence determines whether or 
not an entity is an actor, because “to be an actor implies a minimal level 
of cohesion”.14 Therefore, it must be emphasized that only the states and 
other forms of political unions similar to them (federations or confed-
erations), naturally possess the coherence in stricto sensu. In contrast, the 
EU’s nature is quite problematic to defi ne, as the EU often (incoherent-
ly) refl ects the political views of its Member States, and thus sometimes 
appearing as an international organization, and while at other times as 
7  C. Hill, M. Smith, International relations and the European Union, Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2019.
8  Merriam-Webster Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/co-
herence (access 8.10.2020).
9  Lexico, https://www.lexico.com/en/defi nition/coherence (access 8.10.2020).
10  Ibidem.
11  Cambridge Dictionary, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/co-
herence (access 8.10.2020).
12  Ibidem.
13  P. Thaler, Un-packing Coherence in EU Foreign Policy: How Policy Setting and 
Policy Content Shape EU External Relations Towards Russia, PhD diss., Central Europe-
an University: Doctoral School of Political Science, Public Policy and International 
Relations, https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/578b/62c4017ce78c1928a3c98cda5746bc
55d0db.pdf?_ga=2.171243043.223076566.1572551180-586721100.1572551180, 2015, 
p. 32 (access 8.10.2020).
14  K. Keisala, The EU as an international actor: Strengthens of the European civilian 
power, PhD diss., University of Tampere: Faculty of Social Sciences, https://trepo.
tuni.fi /bitstream/handle/10024/67439/951-44-6157-6.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y, 
2004, p. 84 (access 8.10.2020).
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a state. In order to defi ne more accurately the phenomenon of coherence, 
Joseph Jupille and James A. Caporaso noted four different dimensions 
(Table 1): 1) value cohesion; 2) tactical cohesion; 3) procedural cohesion; 
and 4) output cohesion.15 Observing how the EU works, we added another 
dimension, the cohesion of preferences which implies the ability of the Eu-
ropean Union and its Member States to establish a single approach based 
on setting up common (post-national) goals and objectives. This type of 
cohesion refers to where, when and how to act, primarily taking into ac-
count EU interests as a whole. Consequently, EU leaders must work to-
gether, in order “to increase cohesiveness […] [and thus to] provide the 
EU with a distinctive identity”.16
Table 1. The Dimensions of Cohesion (the author’s own depiction, based 
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Source: K. Keisala, The EU as an international actor: Strengthens of the European civilian 
power, PhD diss., University of Tampere: Faculty of Social Sciences, https://trepo.
tuni.fi /bitstream/handle/10024/67439/951-44-6157-6.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y, 
2004, p. 84 (access 8.10.2020).
15  Ibidem. 
16  R. Grajauskas, Federal Europe: A Postmodern Force in International Relations?, 
http://www.federalistdebate.org/index.php/component/k2/item/63-federal-europe-a-
postmodern-force-in-international-relations (access 30.04.2020). 
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Since the Coronavirus outbreak, every statement, declaration, meeting, 
almost every single sentence consisting the word “COVID-19” starts with 
the words “unpredicted”, “unprecedented” and every other synonym that 
marks the state of surprise to the humanity of the appearance of this virus. 
However, the EU High Representative Josep Borrell acknowledged: “The 
Coronavirus pandemic was predictable [because] infectious disease ex-
perts have been warning us for years about the acceleration in the spread 
of epidemics. This is the third novel beta Coronavirus in the past 20 years 
that has been able to cross the species barrier”.17 Bearing this in mind, 
the obvious question arises: How did we not see this coming? It took 
the EU almost two months to properly move its bureaucratic machinery. 
And that is, since the announcement of the global state of emergency of 
international concern on January 30th, 2020. There were certain actions 
taken though, related to the threat in this period, such as the activation of 
the IPCR,18 several meetings of the Health Council (Employment, Social 
Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs Council), some recommendations 
on travelling in and out of the EU, assessments of the possible impact on 
different areas such as industry, education etc. However, none of it meant 
direct measures for rapid response to the spread of the virus, although 
it was obvious with every single day that passed, the number of infected 
and deceased people would only increase. As a result, “the fi rst instinct of 
Europe’s nations has been to turn inwards, closing borders and hoarding 
supplies without much thought for coordination”.19
One of the strongest blows to the EU’s coherence and solidarity hap-
pened on 26th March, 2020 when Germany and the Netherlands stood 
out strongly against the initiative of Italy, Spain, Portugal and France 
to issue joint bonds to help fi nance an economic stimulus, during a vir-
tual summit of the European Council held by video conference.20 As if 




18  IPCR (Integrated Political Crisis Response) is the EU’s framework for coordi-
nating sectoral crises. Through this mechanism, the Presidency of the Council coor-
dinates the political response to the crisis at the highest level.
19  M. Vestager, The European Response to the Covid-19 Virus, ICDS – International 
Center for Defense and Security, https://icds.ee/the-european-response-to-the-covid-
19-virus/ (access 30.05.2020).
20  B. Rios, F. Schulz, G. Fortuna, J. Valero, Leaders clash over stimulus against pan-
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this wasn’t enough trouble, the sharing of medical equipment and bor-
der controls caused additional misunderstanding and opposed stands. 
This was followed by a series of reactions by high politicians both at the 
EU and national level as well. The French European Affairs minister 
Amelie de Montchalin said that the Coronavirus crisis raised existential 
questions for Europe, emphasizing that: “Our Europe is one of action, 
one of solidarity, and if certain countries see otherwise, well then the 
question of their place will raise itself, as will what the union should be 
doing as a group of 27”.21 Furthermore, David Sassoli, President of the 
European Parliament, raised the question of the disunity in the face of 
the pandemic, asking: “Countries that are still hesitant about this – who 
will you sell your technology or tulips to, if the European market is not 
protected?”.22 He posted this on his Twitter profi le, in reference to Ger-
many and the Netherlands, both opposed to “coronabonds” to re-launch 
the EU economy. Although it is early to make political generalizations 
of chronological events, in our opinion this was the boiling point of the 
EU’s crisis in reaching solidarity and cohesion according to its core val-
ues. Many statements and analyses to this day, as we believe will be the 
case in future efforts to explain this period, will point to this situation at 
this particular period of time when referring to the EU’s failure to help 
its own countries to recover from the crisis. The outcome of this political 
drama was brought when the European Council passed it further to the 
Eurogroup, in order for them to try to propose solutions to the economic 
fallout from the Coronavirus. 
Italy and Spain: The Weakest Link?
We have all heard about the efforts of the governments around the 
world introducing all sorts of protective measures, desperate to avoid 
“Italian or Spanish scenario”, but what exactly does this mean? How 
and why did these particular countries get hit so hard and who is to 
blame? 
Spain and Italy were Europe’s two worst-hit countries by the COVID-19 
pandemic and at one point in time were the world’s second outbreak point 
after China. The two countries have a lot of common characteristics that 
21  A. de Montchalin (twitter status), https://twitter.com/AdeMontchalin/status/ 
1244232500827885568?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwter
m%5E1244232500827885568%7Ctwgr%5E&ref= (access 19.03.2020).
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were in favour of a fast spreading of the virus; specifi c cultures of high af-
fection and socialization, mild climates, various densely populated cities 
and a large number of citizens of older age. Unfortunately, the govern-
ment offi cials’ nonchalance and self-confi dence being way beyond reason-
able was another specifi c trait shared by these two countries, especially 
in the fi rst critical period of the spreading of the virus. Needless to say 
that if China and the other neighbouring countries (South Korea, Singa-
pore) who had the fi rst outbreak of the virus used the “unpredicted” as an 
excuse, Italy and Spain should have known better and used the success-
ful strategies those countries had already developed (and avoid the ones 
that gave bad results). The fi rst of many failures in the Italian response 
to the outbreak was underestimating the speed the virus was spreading 
with, thus failing to make timely decisions as the crisis was rising. At the 
end of February, as the fi rst cases of local transmission were appearing in 
Northern Italy, some politicians decided to make bold public appearanc-
es; Nicola Zingaretti for example, the leader of the center-left Democratic 
Party (who was later diagnosed to be positive with the Coronavirus), ap-
peared in a bar in Milan having the traditional late afternoon apperitivo, 
promoting the idea that Italy should avoid “destroying life or spreading 
panic”.23 To further worsen what was developing to be an almost uncon-
trollable crisis, Italy failed to act in coordination adequate to the level of 
emergency. When the government issued the fi rst decree of the closing 
of Northern Italy on March 8th, 202024 the fi rst reaction of the citizens of 
this region was fl eeing to southern Italy, thereby unstoppably spreading 
the virus to other regions. The government also had disputes with region-
al governors who were calling for a more extensive response. The lack of 
coordination in fi ghting the virus at the national level was very strongly 
replicated at a local level also, which was particularly emphasized in the 
crisis management of Lombardy and Veneto, two neighbouring regions 
that were Italy’s initial outbreak point. Lombardy, considered to be Ita-
ly’s wealthiest region, had a very high rate of registered cases and deaths 
covering a period of almost two months dating from the end of February 
to the beginning of April. Veneto fared signifi cantly better, lowering the 
number of cases in a very short period of time. This result came thanks to 
an extensive approach; based on broad testing and a strong emphasis on 
home care which reduced the hospitals’ burden. Experts said the so-called 
23  L. Besser, Italy’s Coronavirus disaster: At fi rst, offi cials urged people to go out for 





G. Ilik, V. Shapkoski, Coherence on Trial: The Coronavirus Outbreak…
“Veneto model” could have been used early on to shape both regional and 
central policies. That, however, only happened more than a month from 
the start of the outbreak. The same day a quarantine zone was declared 
across Northern Italy, the Spanish government was encouraging people 
across the country to come out for International Women’s Day protests. 
Consequently, and disastrously from this perspective, “thousands of 
women across Spain marched […] against gender inequality to mark In-
ternational Women’s Day, despite concerns the gatherings could help the 
spread of Coronavirus”.25 In the following days, three ministers and the 
fi rst lady (all of them part of the Women’s day march) were tested positive 
for the Coronavirus.26 Among them was Irene Monteno, the equality min-
ister from the Unidas Podemos left-wing party, who tested positive only 
four days after the march.27 
On March 14th, 2020, six days after the International Women’s Day, 
the country was under total lockdown.28 After that, Spain quickly fell be-
hind in testing and only had enough resources to diagnose the most severe 
cases or those in essential workers by the time the state of emergency was 
declared. Later on, the country followed the lead of Veneto by developing 
a strategy to test the population more broadly.
At the same time, the EU failed to act collectively at a moment when 
these two Member States badly needed a display of solidarity, so they had 
no other choice but to impose their own restrictions, border controls, 
and ban the export of medical supplies. At the beginning of the crisis 
Italy seemed to receive more help from China than from its EU partners, 
and that diminished the EU’s reputation among Italian citizens. As if 
this wasn’t enough, when Italy (supported by France, Spain and seven 
other eurozone members) proposed that the EU issue “Coronabonds”,29 
25  E. Rodriguez, Thousands March in Spain on Women’s Day Despite Coronavirus 
Fears, US News, https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2020-03-08/thousands-
march-in-spain-on-womens-day-despite-Coronavirus-fears (access 24.07.2020).
26  C.E. Cue, More Spanish politicians confi rm they have been infected with the Coronavi-
rus, El Pais, https://english.elpais.com/society/2020-03-13/more-spanish-politicians-
confi rm-they-have-been-infected-with-the-Coronavirus.html (access 10.08.2020).
27  Ibidem.
28  P. Rolfe, L. Morris, Spain goes on nationwide lockdown as Coronavirus cases surge, 
Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/Coronavirus-spain- 
nationwide-lockdown/2020/03/14/3bec8690-6619-11ea-8a8e-5c5336b32760_story.
html (access 19.03.2020).
29  A debt instrument that would allow all single-currency-using nations to bor-
row collectively. This instrument would allow pulling the risk between those who 
enjoy strong credit ratings – such as Germany and the Netherlands – and those with 
poor credit ratings – such as Italy. 
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the Germans and Dutch strongly opposed the idea. That provoked not 
only doubt in the EU’s core values and the principle of solidarity but 
also a rising of euroscepticism, especially in Italy. On this occasion, the 
French president Emmanuel Macron emphasized that “the EU had no 
choice but to issue common debt with a common guarantee. The alter-
native was the collapse of the EU as a political project”.30 In the same 
time, Ursula von der Leyen, the President of the European Commis-
sion, has sent a heartfelt apology to Italy on the EU’s behalf for letting 
the country down.31
The EU’s Response to the Coronavirus Crisis
The development of the European Union in both internal as external 
policies and relations is a continuing story. Throughout the years and 
treaties that had been adopted, it has introduced different approaches 
to advance and upgrade its coordination, coherence and responsiveness. 
However, the Coronavirus pandemic impudently emphasizes the EU in 
its entirety, with all of its strengths and weaknesses. A very important part 
of the bigger picture of the EU’s reaction to the crisis is how the public 
saw it and what is left of the EU’s reputation given the elaborated chal-
lenges and obstacles. 
In order to better understand how this pandemic infl uenced the public 
opinion on the EU’s ability to cope with the pandemic, we used the on-
line survey method. This method “is hardly likely to lead to a representa-
tive sample”,32 but it can provide indicative data for research. Exploratory 
studies are typically done for three purposes; “to satisfy the researcher’s 
curiosity and desire for better understanding, to test the feasibility of 
undertaking a more extensive study, and to develop the methods to be 
employed in any subsequent studies”.33 The results obtained from this 
research are indicative and can be used to implement more complex and 
more comprehensive research in the future. Considering this method and 
the time framework provided for the implementation of this online sur-
30  V. Mallet, R. Khalaf, Macron warns of EU unravelling unless it embraces fi nancial 
solidarity, Financial Times, https://www.ft.com/content/d19dc7a6-c33b-4931-9a7e-4-
a74674da29a (access 10.08.2020).
31  J. Gill, EU Commission President offers ‘heartfelt apology’ to Italy, as MEPs debate 
Coronavirus response, Euronews, https://www.euronews.com/2020/04/16/eu-commis-
sion-president-offers-heartfelt-apology-to-italy (access 10.08.2020).
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vey, the sample size seems suffi cient for extracting indicative results. The 
online survey was conducted for the period of 3 weeks (between May 13th, 
2020 – June 4th, 2020) with 122 respondents. Almost half of the respond-
ents were aged 30–45 (49%), nearly 40% were younger people aged 18–29 
and nearly 10% were aged 46+. 
The respondents were mostly familiar with the EU’s health, economic 
and security measures for dealing with the pandemic, slightly less with 
human rights protection measures and hardly knew or had heard of any-
thing else (Table 1). On a scale of 1 to 5 on how timely and appropriate 
the measures taken by the EU were, most of the respondents graded it 
with a medium-good 3, with a tendency to go lower (Chart 2). 
 
Chart 1. What measures has it taken do deal with Covid-19?
Source: Online survey: “The EU and COVID-19 pandemic”, 2020.
Chart 2. How timely and appropriate were the measures taken (scale 1–5)?
Source: Online survey: “The EU and COVID-19 pandemic”, 2020.
63% of the respondents found the crisis in Italy and Spain preventable 
suggesting both that the EU should have reacted quickly and directly 
helped them, and that their own governments should have shown a more 
serious approach instead of wasting precious time (Chart 3).
36
Studia Europejskie – Studies in European Affairs, 4/2020
Chart 3. Was the outbreak in Italy and Spain preventable?
Source: Online survey: “The EU and COVID-19 pandemic”, 2020.
Chart 4. How the question of public health is treated in the EU?
Source: Online survey: “The EU and COVID-19 pandemic”, 2020.
Chart 5. Does a solution to the crisis in the EU require a supranational 
approach?
Source: Online survey: “The EU and COVID-19 pandemic”, 2020.
As we mentioned at the very beginning of this paper, the question of 
public health has rarely been presented as a matter of supranational ap-
proach, and our respondents (70% of them) think that it has been both 
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national as well as supranational. Somewhat expectedly, a bigger part of 
the remaining number think that it has been treated as a strictly national 
issue (25%) and only a few (5%) that it has been treated as a strictly su-
pranational issue. Consequently, the vast majority of them (84%) believe 
that the solution to the COVID-19 crisis lies in a supranational approach 
particularly (Chart 4 and Chart 5).
Chart 6. Do you believe EU member states will invest more in solidarity 
and coherence in the future?
Source: Online survey: “The EU and COVID-19 pandemic”, 2020.
Exactly half of the respondents answered in the affi rmative that the 
EU would invest more in its coherence and solidarity in the future as 
a lesson learned from the Coronavirus pandemic. 41% didn’t believe 
anything would change regarding this matter, and the other 9% be-
lieved that this should be the case, but that it is not a simple job to do 
and requires a lot of changes not only in policies but also in people’s 
mindsets (Chart 6). In that sense, the EU High representative Josep 
Borrell stated: “Once the crisis is over, the people of Europe will deliver 
their own verdict on the approach taken by each member state and by 
Europe as a whole. This makes it vital for the EU to be seen as a player 
that is able to make a difference. This does not mean that it should 
take the place of the member states, but rather that it should build on 
their action to give meaning and substance to the fundamental issue at 
stake: the protection of the European model. But this model will only 
mean something in the eyes of the world if we can successfully promote 
solidarity among the member states. And, on that issue, we still have 
much to do”.34
Just a little above the half-line mark, 51% of the respondents believed 
that the EU should have acted unilaterally without consulting its Mem-
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ber States in order to manage the crisis better and 43% did not believe this 
should be the case. 6% of the respondents had a double opinion, consider-
ing that unilateral approach can be useful when solving this kind of issues 
but that the EU should not fall into a federal “traps” and should consider 
the positions of its Member States at all times (Chart 7).
Chart 7. Do you think EU should have acted unilaterally without consul-
ting its member states?
Source: Online survey: “The EU and COVID-19 pandemic”, 2020.
Regarding how appropriate the existing mechanisms and regulations 
of the EU are in relation to global emergencies, the results can be seen in 
Chart 8.
Chart 8. What do you think of EU mechanisms and regulations when dealing 
with a crisis?
Source: Online survey: “The EU and COVID-19 pandemic”, 2020.
45% of respondents found the European Commission to be the most 
suitable EU institution to call upon when dealing with such crises and 
emergencies. 
The respondents gave very thoroughly-considered suggestions for the 
EU to achieve greater solidarity and coherence in the future, that range 
from better preparation of protocols and mechanisms for urgent reaction, 
shrinking and easing decision processes, improving equality and elimi-
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nate elitism within its borders, to suggestions regarding further integra-
tion of its Member States into a political union.
Chart 9. Which EU institution is the best suited to deal with such crisis?
Source: Online survey: “The EU and COVID-19 pandemic”, 2020.
Conclusions
In times of crisis, any policy-based strategy begins to fall apart. The 
EU is not designed to react quickly to unexpected situations – not because 
something is wrong with its functionality, but because its Member States 
have not entrusted the European Commission with such powers. However, 
the European Commission has taken signifi cant, albeit limited measures 
where it has only had the tools to do so – allocating unused budget funds 
to fi ght the pandemic and its consequences. Many Europeans have called 
for something similar to the relocation mechanism that the Commission 
set up during the 2015 refugee crisis; a quick-action instrument based 
on the principle of solidarity. Both the Eurozone crisis and the migrant 
crisis were sudden, unexpected events that forced EU Member States to 
respond according to their own, national interests.
The problem is that the EU has no existing rules or legal grounds for 
this response. The lack of standards and principles of action is also evi-
dent in the pandemic. In such crises, when events are unpredictable, the 
EU seems chaotic and poorly coordinated, providing solutions that are 
unsupported and even counterproductive and time consuming. 
The EU’s response to the Coronavirus crisis was disappointing at fi rst, 
not so much because of its incoherence, but because of the widespread 
lack of preparedness for the challenge, a shortcoming shared by all Mem-
ber States. The EU’s response was inadequate due to Member States’ re-
fusal to act timely at a European level, for example, being slow to agree to 
the Commission’s proposal regarding the joint procurement of protective 
gear and medical supplies. Namely, the national governments made most 
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of their decisions in a panic, failed to cope with the European Commission’s 
attitude, and often even acted contrary to the Commission’s position. 
But contrary to the negative predictions, the EU did not allow bad 
coordination at the beginning of the crisis, to confuse it. The economic 
reaction came quickly, and it is an area in which the EU has signifi cant 
instruments and opportunities for action which it has put into full opera-
tion in the last month thus demonstrating its size and capabilities. The 
political scientist and President of the Center for Liberal Strategies from 
Bulgaria, Ivan Krastev emphasised that “even though Europeans were 
not impressed by the EU at the beginning of the crisis, they expressed 
a desire for more coordinated policies at the EU level. The consolidation 
of the EU project and empowerment of Brussels are not due to a federalist 
feeling in Europe, but rather to a concrete reason. Citizens realized dur-
ing the crisis that nation-states need the EU in order to remain relevant in 
the world”.35 The EU must have a structure that allows it to react rapidly 
and effectively in emergency situations that will deliver better outcomes 
for its citizens and mitigate the impact on their lives and the economy. 
In that sense, the EU leadership must work harder and more devoted 
with the national leaders in order to pursue the EU interest as a whole. 
Based on that, we imply on the cohesion of preferences as an ability of 
the EU and the Member States to establish a single approach based on 
setting up common objectives and goals, based on the common interests. 
Or, as EU High Representative Josep Borrell emphasized: “Once again, 
we fi nd ourselves living through an existential moment in time for the 
EU – because how we respond will affect the cohesion of our societies, 
the stability of our national political systems, and the future of European 
integration. Now is the time to heal the wounds from previous crises, not 
reopen them. To achieve this, the EU’s institutions and policies need to 
win over the hearts and minds of Europe’s citizens. And, in this regard, 
there is still much to be done”.36
Hence, it can be concluded that it is high time for the EU to take seri-
ous steps towards its own re-establishment based on its founding values, 
taking into account that the interest of one (the European Union) is the 
interest of all (its Member States).
35  A. Robinet-Borgomano, The Paradoxes of a Post-Covid-19 World: Three ques-
tions to Ivan Krastev, Institut Montaigne, https://www.institutmontaigne.org/en/blog/
paradoxes-post-covid-19-world (access 24.07.2020).
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